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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to overturn the lower Court's
order corrunitting him to the Salt Lake County Jail.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
On the 12th day of January, 1976 an Order to
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated
and appellant committed to the Salt Lake County Jail issued.
After a hearing on January 27, 1976, the Honorable Robert

c.

Gibson committed appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail.

A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus issued and was denied.
From the denial this appeal is taken.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the Writ of Habeas Corpus
granted.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of petty
larceny in Salt Lake City Court on the 24th day of October,
1974.

He was sentenced to six months• imprisonment.

Impo-

sition of the sentence was stayed and appellant was placed
on probation for one year.

On January 12, 1976 an Order to

Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated and
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a committment issue; a hearing was held on January 27, 197 ,
before the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, and it was deterrni:.;.
that petitioner had violated his probation and he was orde"
committed to the Salt Lake County Jail for six months.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE APPELLANT ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN
APPELLANT COULD HAVE BEEN INCARCERATED AND.
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION
OVER THE APPELLANT WHEN HE HAD SERVED SIX
MONTHS OF HIS PROBATION--THE STATUTORY LIMIT
FOR INCARCERATION FOR THE CRIME OF WHICH
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED.
This issue is a novel one in this jurisdictioo.
In almost all jurisdictions clear statutes exist which
precisely define the limits placed on the judiciary by the
legislature with respect to permissible lengths of probation.

In those jurisdictions where such statutes do not

exist, the determination of this issue has been a difficult one.

Nevertheless, the weight of the case law indi-

cates that there is only one possible answer to the quesoc·
when no maximum limit is placed by the legislature on the
duration of probation, the limit is the miximum length of
time for which a defendant could have been incarcerated.
The Utah statute with respect to probation reads
as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction
of any crime or offense, if it appears
compatible with the public interest
the court having jurisdiction may s~s
pend the imposition or the execution
of sentence and may place the defendant
on probation for such period of time
as the court may determine.
'The court may subsequently increase
or decrease the probation period, and
may revoke or modify any condition of
probation. (77-35-17 Utah Code Anno.,
1953)."
As the statute is presently written no limit to
the duration of probation appears on its face.

Apparently

the statute grants power to the judiciary to place appellant
on probation for as long as the Court sees fit, even for the
entire life of defendant, and to subsequently revoke probation and then impose a prison sentence,

It is appellant's

contention that such an interpretation of the statute is
contrary to general principles of law and deprives defendant
of important fundamental freedoms in an unconscionable manner.
In Oklahoma the question was first raised in Ex Parte
~'

29 Okla. Ct. App. 275, 233 P. 781 (1925).

In that case

the statute provided that a qualified defendant might be placed
on probation and remain on probation provided that he was not
later guilty of a violation of any law or condition
bation.

of pro-

Defendant had been sentenced to two years in prison,

but imposition was stayed and defendant was placed on probation.

-

3 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Three months after defendant had completed serving two yea::
of probation, the trial court revoked the order of probatir,
and ordered defendant incarcerated.

The Oklahoma Supreme

Court disallowed the order:
"It was certainly not the intention
of the lawmakers to hold sentence over
the head of the person paroled so long
as he should live, but only during the
pendency of the judgment.
To hold
otherwise would be contrary to the
spirit and policy of the law.
(233 P.
at 782; emphasis added)
Ex Parte Eaton, supra, has been followed in many
other cases in that jurisdiction:

Ex Parte King, 40 Okla.

Ct. App. 21, 266 P. 511 (1928); Ex Parte Anderson, 47 Okla.
Ct. App. 363, 288 P. 503 (1920); In re Workman, 74 Okla.
Ct. App. 225

(1942); Ex Parte Miller, 88 Okla. Ct. App. 44:

(1949); Ex Parte Bell, 57 Okla. Ct. App. 257, 47 P.2d 886
(1935).

Though the Oklahoma statute dealt with minors,
that point was immaterial to the Court.
statute by saying:

It interpreted its

"If there is any ambiguity, it should

be resolved in favor of the person sentenced." (233 P.
at 782).

It was the Court's considered opinion that proba·

tionary periods should not exceed statutory periods of
incarceration unless the legislature affirmatively granted
such a power to the judiciary in precise, defined terms.
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In Kansas a statute gave the judiciary the alternative of choosing probation under certain conditions.

The

statute then went on to say i
"Such judge may at any time, without
notice to such persons, terminate such
parole by simply directing execution
to issue on the judgment." (Kansas Laws
of 1909, c. 116, Sec. 2; emphasis added.)
In In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914),
the Court recognized the apparent grant of absolute discretion, yet the Court found it difficult to admit of such
control by the judiciary.

The case involved a misdemeanor

punishable under statutory authority by no more than six
months imprisonment.

The Court argued strenuously that

there had to be a limit to the Court •s discretion to place
a defendant on probation for extended periods of times
"Although the statute relating to
paroles (probation) granted by police
judges does not expressly declare a
limit, one is doubtless contemplated,
and, since provision is made for imprisonment for a fixed time, that should
be regarded as the limit of time for
the termination of a parole (probation)
and the absolute discharge of the paroled
person." (137 P. at 977; emphasis and
parentheses added.)
In re Carroll was followed by Simons v. Walston,
123 Kan. 574, 255 P. 975 (1926).

It was not until the

~islature amended the statute some 33 years later that

the Kansas court altered its position because the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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amended portion provided for probat;..on of '...lp to twc "·e~:-;
in the case of misdemeanors.

Application of Young,

20~

,

140, 439 p. 2d 142 (1968) •
In Idaho, beginning with State v.
71 Id. 282, 230 P,2d 696

~i%elber~e:

(195l), the Idaho Supreme Cc..:r:

interpreted its 1947 probation stat:ite .,,.hich granted

-r

the trial court the right to place on probation ··:or

s:.:~.-.

time as it may prescribe."

In spite o: such broad ar:C: :::·

eral language, the Supre.'lle Court o: Idar.o has a.: so re:-.:s::
to grant such enormous power to t::e courts ·..-i ':l:out sc!:'.e
legislative pronouncement.
"The period of probation a..~d restrai.::t
of ~"le liberty of the ::iefe!"lda::t exte:-.ded
:er -:·..ro years, while t:-.e cri::ie •,.;hi.ch C.:::e
de:e::dar:t was found gui..: t:::· of ccrr:ir.i tti::g
was punishable by imprisc:-.;ner:t fer a ?erix
of time :iot exceedi:lg six ::ic::-:.....~s ... ::ie Cc-.:::
had the power to i=tpose a : :idqme:-. t a::d cr:e:
of probation for a period cf six =c::ths.
(230 P.2d at 701)

73 Id. 474, 253 P.2d 794

(1953) a..~d . ..., State·:. Sa.":dc•:a~

92 Id. 853, 452 P.2d 350,

(1969~.

holding were disct!ssed bv

~':e

::::::r;...::.a s·.::;::re=€ :::::·.i=: as

recently as six
_ _ _ , 328 so. 2d 223

,::ro· :
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-"There is validity to not allowing
probation to extend beyond the period
of maximum sentences. First, a penal
statute must be strictly construed
in favor of those against whom it
would operatei and second, to infer
that a court could extend probation
beyond such a maximum permitted punishment would lead to unacceptable
results. For although the period of
probation imposed here was only one
year beyond the maximum sentence,
the absence of any limit raises the
possibility that a Judge could direct
many years of probation even for a
misdemeanor, a concept which has
the potential to inJect further disparities into the corrective process."
(328 So.2d at 223, emphasis added)
The Florida Court is correct.

However small the

disparities might appear for those of us never incarcerated,
they would not be so for those forced to endure them.

Forum

shopping, though often the cry of "wolf," is a real possibility both for the defense seeking leniency as well as for
the prosecution who might have a defendant on a minor charge
but wish to keep him "out of circulation."
The Florida case is all the more significant because
of the history of its probation statute.

It was originally

drafted in 1943 and provided for probation to exceed the
incarceration limit by two years,

In 197 4 the statute was

altered so as to contain no limits at all.

The statute could

have been construed so as to allow for a lenient and broad
interpretation, but the court rejected that approach, Watts v.
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In another recent case in Wyoming, Hicklin v. Sta.
_ _ _ Wyo.

535 P.2d 743 (1976), the Court was

qui~:

concerned about the rights of a defendant and after a prolo:
discussion of the problems, refused to grant such total discretion to the judiciary.
"A person on probation is not serving a
sentence but is in a status something
less than imprisonment that follows upon
suspension of sentence. It connotes an
absence of the rigors of confinement in
a penitentiary, but at the same time is
a substitute for complete imprisonment.
It is imposed only upon convicted criminals,
and results in a considerable restriction
upon their liberty as well as intrusions
upon their private lives. Fundamentally,
it is a device for achieving the same
social goals furthered by the more conventional penalty of society•s desire
for retribution and deterrence and its
hope for rehabilitation. It is a loss
of a part of cherished liberty in that
freedom of movement and activity is
restricted; the criminal is constantly
under surveillance, must report his activities on a regular basis, and is deprived
of intoxicants. In this case, twelve
restraints are placed upon independence ••• A probationer is a convict
without bars with a sword of threat
hanging over his head, that for a deviation the doors may be slammed shut on
him.
•we therefore conclude that probation is
constructive confinement and the restraints
of probation cannot exceed a period in
excess of the maximum term of imprisonment
authorized by the statute violated."
(535 P.2d at 753; emphasis added)
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The Wyoming Supreme Court was not persuaded by
arguments that probation is some sort of humanitarian grace
period, some wonderful chance to be free and be pardoned,
some light tap on the hand.

It is not!

It is in fact a

kind of incarceration.
We are in fact discussing the restriction of a
man's freedom, a penalty imposed on his conduct.
is not a gift.

Probation

It is a better situation than the bars of

a prison cell, but probation is also the restriction of fundamental freedoms.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the
penal qualities of the probation sentence.

Korernatsu v.

United States, 319 U.S. 432, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497
(1943).

" ••• incidents of probation emphasize
that a probation order is •an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the probation being intended
as a reforming discipline. • 11 (319 U.S.
at 435)
See also Cooper v. United States, (5th Cir.),
91 F.2d 195

(1937).

In that case the Court goes on to say:

"We do not agree with appellant's contention that probation, like pardon,
may be refused by the convicted person.
The act vests a discretion in the Court,
not a choice in the convict. 11 (91 F. 2d
at 199, emphasis added)
Probation cannot be looked at as anything less than
a sentence of limited incarceration.

Authority for sentencing
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must come from the legislature.

Hicklin v. State, supra·

-·

Affronti v. United States, 3SO U.S. 79, 76 S. Ct. 171, lOC
L. Ed. 62
290

(19SS); Andrus v, Turner,

(10th Cir.), 421 F.2d

(1970); In re Gutierrez, 82 Ariz. 21, 307 P.2d 914,

(19S7) cert. den. 3SS U.S. 17, 78

s.

Ct. 79, 2 L. Ed. 2d2i

State v. Perez, lS Ariz. App. 300, 488 P.2d SOS (1971);
Pete v. State,

Ala.

379 P.2d 62S (1963); Sta:

v. Smith, 83 Okla. Ct. 188, 174 P,2d 932
Furthermore

I

(1946).

a large body of law stands for the

r

position that probation can only exist if the legislature
acts.

Affronti v. United States, supra; People ex rel

Lindauer v. O'Donnell, 37 Cal. App. 192, 174 P. 102 (19
Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S.E. 843

(1926);

~

Eaton, supra; In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A, 24 (1927);
Fla.

Pickman v. State,
State v. Duncan,

----

Ore.

- - - , lSS So.
- - - , Sl4 p. 2d

2d 646 (1963
1367 (1973).

On the basis of all the above case law, it is cle
that in the absence of a statute clearly defining the ~
to which a court may go in imposing probation, a trial coi;;
may not impose a probation sentence for a period longer th'
the statutory period for incarceration.

To the same affec:

are several proposed criminal codes.
The American Bar Association and several other
groups have proposed model codes as suggestions for state
Legislators in the area of probation.

Groups such as t.~e
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ABA

have suggested statutes which allow courts to order pro-

bation for periods longer than the stipulated period for
incarceration,

ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice -

Standards Relating to Probation,

On the other hand, the

National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standards
and Goals

(Corrections) §16.11 advises that probation not

exceed the prescribed limits for incarceration.
opinion on the subject is therefore apparent.
chosen both types of statutes.

No uniform
States have

With such disparity over an

issue involving personal freedoms surely the courts ought to
function with judicial restraint and allow the legislature
to perform its proper function and make a determination of
the pressures and philosophical questions involved in a forum
best suited to that process.
Secondly, the fact that many states have adopted
one or the other of the proposed statutes or revised versions
of these model codes cannot impute to the Utah Legislature
a statute it has not adopted no matter what the national trend.
More importantly, whatever the trend of other State Legislatures,
certainly their considered and debated opinions should not
influence courts to take upon themselves a legislative function by choosing one of the two alternative statutes.
Thirdly, although the ABA certainly advocates a
broader statute , it does not advocate court adoption of its
1
' '

0

del statute.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

"(al The legislature should authorize
the sentencing court in every case
to impose a sentence of probation."
(Part I. General Principles.
1.1 Nature
of sentence of probation, emphasis added)
At the outset, the ABA recognizes the Legislatur:
authority and prerogative in this area.

The ABA is quick

to acknowledge that courts must receive permission to impose this sentence.
To further emphasize this principle at (d) of the
same provisions, the ABA states:
"Neither supervision nor the power to
revoke should be permitted to extend
beyond a legislatively fixed time."
(emphasis added)
The ABA is not asking courts to do anything.

It

recommending quite strongly that Legislatures allow courts:
function in this area and that Legislatures maintain a fir.r
control over the subject, presumably to avoid abuse and en:.
a proper functioning of the system with useful, practical,
and equitable standards.
CONCLUSION
Appellant petitions this Court to vacate the orde
of incarceration entered by the lower Court on the 27th da:
of January, 1976, and grant appellant• s Writ of Habeas cor:

:~ t:l~

submitted,

..o ~">/'4.r
ert • McRae

11/2 -

. .
1 ,,
Attorney for Petitioner-Ap~-370 East Fifth South
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to the
office of the Attorney General, Utah State Capitol, Salt

Lake City, UT 84114 this 3d day of September, 1976, postage
prepaid.
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